Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

On August 18, 1944, one of the most daring and curious operations of the Soviet state security agencies began. Codenamed Operation Berezino

In the summer of 1944, the largest offensive operation of the Red Army was launched, as a result of which Belarus was completely liberated from the fascists.20

However, some German units, who were surrounded, tried to get out of it. Most of them were destroyed or taken prisoner. This circumstance was used by intelligence, starting with the enemy a new radio game, called Berezino. Her "godfather" can be called Stalin, who suggested the game to the scouts. It was necessary to mislead the Germans, creating the impression of the active actions of their units in the rear of our troops, and then fraudulently compel the German command to use its resources to support them. The head of the operation was the head of the 4th NKVD Sudoplatov, who was assisted by Eitingon, Maklyarsky and Mordvinov.The work of radio operators led by William Fisher.21

On August 18, 1944, Heine, aka Alexander Demyanov, also Max, told the Germans on his radio that the German part of more than two thousand people was hiding under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Sherhorn in the Berezina River.22

In reality, such a part did not exist. Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Sherhorn was captured in the Minsk region and recruited by state security agencies. His group included German agents, former prisoners of war, and German anti-fascists. A special operational group of Soviet intelligence led Sherkhorn and his entire "part". She was given help twenty machine gunners. That's the whole "army" of Sherhorn. In addition, to protect the operation from accidents, the approaches and its location were carefully guarded by troop patrols, and several anti-aircraft and machine gun installations were disguised not far from it. The Germans did not immediately respond to the “Heine” radiogram. Apparently, they checked the identity of Lieutenant Colonel Sherhorn according to some accounts and channels. Finally, on August 25, they instructed Heine to contact Cherkhorn, to report the exact coordinates of the part for the release of the cargo and the sending of the radio operator.23

By this time, Heine was (for the Germans) seconded to a military unit located in the town of Berezino, not far from the place where Sherhorn was hiding. He "managed" to contact the lieutenant colonel, tell the Germans his whereabouts. A convenient platform for dumping cargo and landing aircraft was selected. About this "Heine" informed Berlin.
On the night of September 15-16, the Germans threw out three radio operators at the indicated coordinates. They were met and taken to Sherhorn. They reported that a part of Sherhorn was reported to Hitler and Goring, who were told to convey that everything possible would be done to save her. The doctor and the officer from the air unit will be sent to the unit, who must select a landing site for the aircraft. Two German radio operators managed to recruit, and they joined in the "game", confirming the existence of part of Sherhorn.24

The Germans continued to throw away loads of food, equipment, medicines. On December 21, they dropped two German radio operators and four Belarusians who graduated from a German intelligence school. The German radio operators were also recruited and used in the "game". The German command offered to Sherhorn to break up their "part" into groups so that they could independently go to the front line. It was "done."Now the German command had to take care of not one, but three "military units".
After the groups moved to the West, they received a significant amount of cargo from German aircraft. Food (chocolate, biscuits, glucose, which our army did not have at all) had a laboratory test, then it was given to dogs, and only after that people used it. And the Germans all the time reported that delays in transit occur due to lack of food and ammunition.25

Sometimes it was reported about sabotage in the rear of the Red Army, which allegedly commit parts of Sherhorn.
From the end of October 1944, the German command began to demand more and more persistently from Sherhorn to prepare the conditions for landing aircraft. Considering that this could lead to failure, the USSR NKGB took all measures to tighten the operational game, and then, under the pretext of pursuing "part" of Sherhorn by units of the Red Army, declare to the Germans that it was impossible to accept the aircraft.26

The Red Army troops were rapidly moving to the West, and “part” of Sherhorn could not “catch up” with them - the battles were already on the territory of Germany.On May 1, 1945, the Germans told Sherhorn that Hitler was killed, and on May 5, all the radio stations that participated in the game with the enemy in the Berezino case, the Germans transmitted the last telegram: "The superiority of the enemy forces overcame Germany. The air fleet ready for shipment was delivered to be cannot. With a heavy heart, we have to stop helping you. Based on this situation, we can no longer maintain radio contact with you. Whatever the future brings us, our thoughts will always be with you, who are in such a difficult moment t have to be disappointed in their hopes. "27

It was the end of the game. Soviet intelligence brilliantly beat the intelligence of fascist Germany.
Game results? The information about them is provided by a certificate from the archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation dated March 8, 1947 on this undercover affair.
“The Belazino’s“ intelligence work ”was instituted in September 1944 for the purpose of a radio game with German intelligence agencies and the high command of the German army about the presence of supposedly large formations of German fascist troops in the Berezino region of the Byelorussian SSR.
To maintain the moral and fighting spirit of its soldiers and officers in the Soviet rearThe German High Command systematically transferred its agents and various cargoes to the specified area from aircraft.28

Thus, according to archival data, from September 1944 to May 1945, the Germans made 39 sorties in the Soviet rear and threw 22 German scouts who were arrested by the Fourth Directorate of the USSR NKGB, 13 radio stations, 255 cargo places with weapons, ammunition, uniforms , medicines, food and 1 777 000 rubles of Soviet money.

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  • Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence

    Little-known feats of Soviet intelligence